“Inextricably Intertwined” Explicable at Last?: Rooker-Feldman Analysis After the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil Decision by Rowe, Thomas D., Jr. & Baskauskas, Edward L.
FEDERAL COURTS LAW REVIEW  MAY 2006 
 
 
                                                          
“INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED” EXPLICABLE AT LAST? 
ROOKER-FELDMAN ANALYSIS AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S EXXON MOBIL 
DECISION 
 
By Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., and Edward L. Baskauskas*
* Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., is Elvin R. Latty Professor of Law at Duke University and Straus Distinguished Visitor at 
Pepperdine University School of Law.  Edward L. Baskauskas is Adjunct Professor of Law at Golden Gate 
University School of Law.  They are, respectively, reviser and drafter for Chapter 133 of Moore’s Federal Practice, 
which includes coverage of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  The views expressed here are their own.  Professor 
Rowe is grateful for research support received from the Eugene T. Bost Research Professorship of the Charles A. 
Cannon Charitable Trust No. 3.  For careful and valuable editorial suggestions we are thankful to Professor David 
Shapiro, Magistrate Judge Kenneth Neiman, and Professor Rowe’s colleague and running partner Joan Magat.  
Surviving errors are of course ours. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Supreme Court’s March 2005 decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries 
Corp. substantially limited the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine, under which lower federal courts 
largely lack jurisdiction to engage in what amounts to de facto review of state-court decisions.  
Exxon Mobil’s holding is quite narrow—entry of a final state-court judgment does not destroy 
federal-court jurisdiction already acquired over parallel litigation.  But the Court’s articulation of 
when Rooker-Feldman applies, and its approach in deciding the case, have significant implica-
tions for several aspects of Rooker-Feldman jurisprudence.   
 
Chief among our claims is that although the Court did not expressly repudiate or limit the appli-
cability of the “inextricably intertwined” formulation from prior cases, which had been a primary 
test for many lower courts, that concept appears to have been relegated to some secondary role 
and no longer to be a general or threshold test.  The Exxon Mobil Court properly did not elabo-
rate on just what the concept’s role should be, but we offer a suggestion based on an earlier 
Ninth Circuit decision.  We also discuss the apparent impact of Exxon Mobil on other aspects of 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine as the lower federal courts had developed it, including relation to 
preclusion doctrines, the significance of whether the federal plaintiff was plaintiff or defendant 
in state court, and the doctrine’s applicability a) to those not parties to prior state-court litigation, 
b) to interlocutory state-court rulings and decisions of lower state courts, and c) when federal-
court plaintiffs did not raise their federal claims in state court.  A February 2006 per curiam 
decision applying Exxon Mobil, Lance v. Davis, reinforces the Court’s position on some of these 
issues.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Under the federal courts’ Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it has been significant for jurisdic-
tional purposes whether a claim made in district court is “inextricably intertwined” with a state 
court’s decision.1  In its treatment of the doctrine, Moore’s Federal Practice let a droll Freudian 
slip creep into a footnote heading:  “State claim must be inexplicably [sic] intertwined with 
federal claim for doctrine to apply.”2  The error probably expresses the attitude of many lawyers, 
judges, and academics toward what had become a much-used but murky limit on the original 
subject-matter jurisdiction of federal district courts.3  Sweeping extensions and conflicting 
interpretations of Rooker-Feldman finally led to a clarifying Supreme Court decision last year in 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.4  That case has since been followed by Lance 
v. Dennis,5 in which the Court summarily reaffirmed Exxon Mobil’s narrow view of Rooker-
Feldman. 
 
 This Article surveys the Rooker-Feldman seascape in the wake of the Exxon Mobil 
opinion.  It provides brief background but does not attempt full exploration of the many strands 
of Rooker-Feldman lore in earlier decisions by the lower federal courts or in commentary—
partly because we believe that Exxon Mobil provides a new enough starting point that detailed 
background is not warranted.6  The Article then analyzes the Exxon Mobil opinion—at some 
length to tease out its subtleties—and considers how several aspects of Rooker-Feldman appear 
to have been affected by the decision.7  Chief among our claims is that the “inextricably inter-
twined” formulation, although not expressly repudiated or limited, appears to have been rele-
1  The phrase first appeared in this context in the Supreme Court’s second major decision in the Rooker-Feldman 
line, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  See id. at 482 n.16 (“If the constitu-
tional claims presented to a United States district court are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial in a 
judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff’s application for admission to the state bar, then the district court is in 
essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.  This the district court may not do.”), 486-87 (some of 
the plaintiffs’ allegations in their complaints “are inextricably intertwined with the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals’ decisions, in judicial proceedings, to deny [their] petitions [for admission to the D.C. Bar].  The District 
Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction over these elements of [their] complaints.”) (alteration to original).   
2  18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[3][c][ii], at 133-30 n.26 (3d ed. 2004) (boldface omitted).  The mis-
taken use of “inexplicably” appeared as recently as the publication’s Release 144, issued December 2004.  But you 
won’t find it any more; killjoys that we are, we’ve corrected the slip. 
3  See, for example, the title of a foreword to a symposium on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 
Rooker-Feldman:  Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081 (1999). 
4  544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
5  126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006) (per curiam). 
6  Besides, we don’t want to write all the footnotes that law-review editors would make us include if we gave ex-
tensive background. 
 
7  Footnotes discuss several significant lower-court applications of Exxon Mobil since that decision. 
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gated to—at most—some secondary role and in any event no longer to be a general or threshold 
test.  We also discuss the apparent impact of Exxon Mobil and Lance on other aspects of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine as the lower federal courts had developed it, including a) its relation to 
preclusion doctrines, b) the significance of whether the federal plaintiff was the plaintiff in state 
court, and c) the doctrine’s applicability i) to those not parties to prior state-court litigation, ii) to 
interlocutory state-court rulings and decisions of lower state courts, and iii) when federal-court 
plaintiffs did not raise their federal claims in state court.  We confine ourselves to the main 
effects of the Exxon Mobil decision and do not try to cover comprehensively aspects of Rooker-
Feldman that appear to be unchanged, such as its being a subject-matter jurisdictional doctrine 
that federal courts are supposed to raise on their own initiative if the parties do not.8
 
II.  THE BASICS OF THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE 
 
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from two cases decided sixty years apart, 
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.9 and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman.10  It rests 
on inferences from two aspects of the federal courts’ statutory jurisdictional structure—that 
district-court jurisdiction is original, not appellate,11 and that the Supreme Court is the only 
federal court given statutory appellate jurisdiction over decisions of any state courts.12  It follows 
that lower federal courts have no jurisdiction to entertain what is, or amounts to, an appeal from 
a state-court decision.13  The doctrine thus operates in a unique way to constrain federal subject-
matter jurisdiction:  a federal district court, dealing with a case that on its face comes within an 
express grant of jurisdiction (most commonly because it presents a federal claim), will nonethe-
less lack jurisdiction because of prior state-court adjudication. 
 
8  See, e.g., 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[3][b], at 123-25 (3d ed. 2006). 
9  263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
10  460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
11  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000) (actions against foreign states); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (federal question); 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (diversity and alienage); and 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) (admiralty) (each of which refers 
to “original jurisdiction”). 
12  See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a 
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court” under certain circumstances). 
13  A semi-exception is federal habeas corpus for state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000), which allows 
some degree of collateral federal attack upon state criminal convictions and civil commitments.  The attack takes the 
form of a new federal civil action, typically against the habeas petitioner’s warden or the state corrections superin-
tendent, but if allowed it involves federal lower-court review of state courts’ federal-law rulings and sometimes 
their fact findings.  See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292 n.8 (“Congress, if so minded, may explicitly empower district 
courts to oversee certain state-court judgments and has done so, most notably, in authorizing federal habeas review 
of state prisoners’ petitions.”). 
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 Application of the Rooker-Feldman constraint can be easy when a federal-court plaintiff 
baldly seeks to have the court set aside a state-court judgment, as some plaintiffs occasionally do 
despite the doctrine.14  But the relationship between a federal claim and state adjudication, and 
hence the applicability of Rooker-Feldman, is not always so simple and raises many issues, for 
example, the extent to which the doctrine’s jurisdictional constraint overlaps state preclusion 
doctrines applicable in federal court under the full faith and credit statute.15  Some circuits such 
as the Second, Eighth, and Tenth had taken Rooker-Feldman quite far, by largely conflating it 
with preclusion,16 making it applicable when federal-court plaintiffs had had no opportunity to 
raise their claims in state court,17 or even extending it to nonparties to prior state-court proceed-
ings.18  Other circuits, notably the Seventh19 and Ninth,20 had generally been less expansive.  
For its part, the Supreme Court had passed up chances to review some far-reaching and contro-
versial applications of Rooker-Feldman,21 so the cert grant in Exxon Mobil raised much anticipa-
tion in the hardy band of federal-jurisdiction wonks.  The Court did not disappoint. 
14  See, e.g., Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (federal plaintiff sought order compelling 
state court to recall its decision); United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994) (action “to set aside 
and void” state-court judgment); Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991) (describing federal-court 
plaintiff’s complaint as including a “request to vacate and to set aside” state-court default judgment). 
15  28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000); see Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523 (1986) (“under the 
Full Faith and Credit Act [28 U.S.C. § 1738] a federal court must give the same preclusive effect to a state-court 
judgment as another court of that State would give.”). 
16  See Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[W]here a federal 
plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding (as either the plaintiff or defendant in that 
proceeding), subsequent litigation of the claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if it would be 
barred under the principles of preclusion.”). 
17  See Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 478 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Rooker-Feldman bars any suit that 
seeks to disrupt or ‘undo’ a prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the 
federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims.”). 
18  See Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 495 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Rooker-Feldman is based squarely on 
federal law and is concerned with federalism and the proper delineation of the power of the lower federal courts.  
Such courts are simply without authority to review most state court judgments—-regardless of who might request 
them to do so.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001). 
19  See, e.g., GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993) (if federal plaintiff “pre-
sent[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to 
which he was a party . . ., then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under 
principles of preclusion”). 
20  See, e.g., Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]here the federal plaintiff does not complain of a 
legal injury caused by a state court judgment, but rather of a legal injury caused by an adverse party, Rooker-
Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.”). 
21  See Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 488 (“Rooker-Feldman is based squarely on federal law and is concerned with federal-
ism and the proper delineation of the power of the lower federal courts.  Such courts are simply without authority to 
review most state court judgments--regardless of who might request them to do so.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 
(2001); Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996) (no jurisdiction over federal-court attack 
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III.  THE EXXON MOBIL LITIGATION AND OPINION 
 
 Exxon Mobil posed one of several questions concerning the scope of Rooker-Feldman—
whether a state-court judgment rendered while a parallel federal action was pending could 
deprive a lower federal court of original jurisdiction that had been properly invoked.  (If not, 
claim or issue preclusion might still make the federal-court plaintiff’s action unsuccessful, but on 
merits-based preclusion grounds rather than for lack of jurisdiction.)  Saudi Basic Industries 
Corp., a majority government-owned Saudi Arabian corporation, sued two ExxonMobil22 sub-
sidiaries in Delaware state court for a declaratory judgment that certain disputed royalty charges 
were proper.  Around two weeks later, ExxonMobil and the subsidiaries sued Saudi Basic as a 
foreign government entity23 in the New Jersey federal district court to recover the alleged over-
charges.  The subsidiaries also counterclaimed in state court for the overcharges and eventually 
won a large judgment, which was on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court at the time of the 
relevant proceedings in the Third Circuit. 
 
 That court had before it an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s ruling rejecting 
Saudi Basic’s claim of sovereign immunity.  The Third Circuit panel sua sponte raised the 
question whether the state trial court’s judgment triggered Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional bar 
even though federal subject-matter jurisdiction initially had properly attached.  Reading the 
doctrine broadly, the panel reasoned that if Saudi Basic won its pending state-court appeal, then 
ExxonMobil’s federal suit would be seeking to undo a state-court judgment—-“the very situation 
contemplated by Rooker-Feldman’s ‘inextricably intertwined’ bar.”24  Hence, the Third Circuit 
concluded, the lower federal courts had lost jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari25 
 
on state court’s approval of attorney fees in class-action settlement, brought by class members over whom state 
court arguably lacked jurisdiction), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1204 (1997).  The Supreme Court denied cert without 
published dissent even though five judges of the Seventh Circuit, including then-Chief Judge Posner and Judges 
Easterbrook and Diane Wood, had dissented vociferously from denial of rehearing.  See Kamilewicz v. Bank of 
Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1349 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
22  The company’s full name is Exxon Mobil Corporation, but it appears that the corporation uses “ExxonMobil” (no 
space between “Exxon” and “Mobil”) as a short-form reference to itself. See Exxon Mobil Corporation Home Page,  
http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).  The Supreme Court’s opinion often uses this 
short form to refer to the company, as does this Article.  However, the style of the case as reported includes the full 
name of the corporation, with a space between “Exxon” and “Mobil.”  We therefore retain the space when referring 
to the decision itself. 
23  Jurisdiction rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000), which authorizes district-court original jurisdiction over actions 
against foreign states. 
24  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d, 544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
25  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 543 U.S. 924 (2004). 
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in order “to resolve conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the scope of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine.”26
 
 The Supreme Court reversed, in a unanimous opinion by Associate Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg.  The opinion proceeds in four parts:  an unnumbered introduction, including a distilla-
tion of how the Court now views Rooker-Feldman; a descriptive part I summarizing Rooker, 
Feldman, and the few other Supreme Court cases dealing with the doctrine; an account in part II 
of the proceedings below; and a part III restating how the Court views the doctrine and applying 
its distillation to decide the case. 
 
 The introduction in several ways emphasizes that the Court regards Rooker-Feldman as 
properly confined to narrow application.  Its first sentence notes that Rooker and Feldman are the 
only two cases in which the Court has “applied” the doctrine,27 apparently in the sense of apply-
ing it to hold that lower federal courts lacked jurisdiction.  The Court then introduces two themes 
it amplifies later, the existence of concurrent state- and federal-court jurisdiction and the signifi-
cance of preclusion:  “[T]he doctrine has sometimes been construed to extend far beyond the 
contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court 
jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary 
application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738.”28
 
 As a negative example the Court cites a Second Circuit decision that construed “inextri-
cably intertwined” as largely conflating preclusion and Rooker-Feldman.  That court had said: 
 
[The phrase] means, at a minimum, that where a federal plaintiff had an opportu-
nity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding (as either the plaintiff or defendant in 
that proceeding), subsequent litigation of the claim will be barred under the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine if it would be barred under the principles of preclu-
sion.29
   
 Continuing, the Exxon Mobil opinion notes the bases of the doctrine—that the Supreme 
Court is the only federal court with appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, and that the 
jurisdiction of the federal district courts is original, not appellate.30  The Court then gives its first 
statement of the circumstances under which Rooker-Feldman applies to bar federal-court juris-
diction: 
26  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005).  For a somewhat more detailed 
account of the proceedings below, see id. at 289-91. 
27  Id. at 283. 
28  Id. 
29  Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) (cited 
with “See, e.g.,” signal immediately following quotation in text accompanying note 28 supra, 544 U.S. at 283). 
30  See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283. 
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 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of the 
kind from which the doctrine acquired its name:  cases [1] brought by state-court 
losers [2] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered 
before the district court proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district court re-
view and rejection of those judgments.  Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise over-
ride or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that 
allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court ac-
tions.31
 
The introduction’s concluding paragraph emphasizes “the narrow ground occupied by Rooker-
Feldman”32 before the opinion turns in part I to a longer description of the Court’s cases dealing 
with the doctrine. 
 
 Aspects of Exxon Mobil’s part I that bear on the Court’s interpretation of Rooker-
Feldman are important for the elucidations we offer here.  The opinion treats Rooker briefly as a 
relatively simple case involving a bald-faced attempt by parties who had lost in state court to 
have a federal district court declare the state-court judgment “‘null and void.’”33  Rooker  thus 
seems to exemplify the most basic and uncontroversial aspect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 
i.e., telling state-court losers that the way to try to get a federal court to review an adverse deci-
sion on a federal-law matter is to seek direct review in the federal Supreme Court.  If they try 
instead to bring what the Ninth Circuit has called “a forbidden de facto appeal”34 in federal 
district court, Rooker-Feldman requires dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction in an original-
jurisdiction-only federal court. 
 
 Feldman, as the Exxon Mobil opinion reflects, was not quite so cut-and-dried.  Disap-
pointed applicants for admission to the District of Columbia Bar who had not graduated from an 
ABA-approved law school had petitioned the D.C. Court of Appeals (the highest court of the 
District of Columbia, and for jurisdictional purposes the equivalent of a state supreme court35) 
31  Id. at 284 (bracketed numbers added).  In the first paragraph of the opinion’s concluding part III, the Court 
restates these characteristics in terms apparently identical in effect although not verbatim in phrasing.  The opinion 
explains that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in the “limited circumstances” illustrated by those two cases, in 
which:  “[1] the losing party in state court [3] filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended, [2] 
complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and [4] seeking review and rejection of that judgment.”  
Id. at 291 (bracketed numbers, corresponding to those in quotation in text, added). 
32  Id. at 284. 
33  Id. (quoting Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414 (1923)). 
34  Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).  Full disclosure:  this Article’s co-author Rowe is brother-in-
law of Ninth Circuit Judge William Fletcher, who wrote for the Noel panel.  The Article, of course, in no way 
speaks for Judge Fletcher or his court. 
35  See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(b) (2000) (“For the purposes of this section, the term ‘highest court of a State’ includes the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.”). 
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for waiver of a rule made by the court itself that required graduation from an ABA-approved law 
school.  After the court denied their requests, the applicants brought several constitutional claims 
against it in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.  The Feldman Court 
viewed the challenges as going partly to the accreditation rule itself and partly to its application 
by the D.C. court.  The latter challenges, the Court determined, were “inextricably intertwined” 
with action by the D.C. court in a judicial capacity and were thus outside the lower federal 
courts’ jurisdiction, whereas the challenges to the rule’s general validity were to action by the 
D.C. court in a non-judicial capacity and therefore could proceed in the district court.3  
 
6
Two points are of major significance in Exxon Mobil’s discussion of Feldman:  First, the 
Court reads Feldman in a way that puts “inextricably intertwined” in a non-threshold part of that 
case’s analysis.  Second, the opinion mentions the “inextricably intertwined” test only in this 
descriptive part I and in so much of part II as recounts the decision under review, without saying 
anything positive or negative about what it thinks of the phrase—but using it not at all in the 
introduction and part III, where the Court states its view of Rooker-Feldman and decides the 
case. 
 
 To expand somewhat on these points:  The Exxon Mobil Court reads part III-A of 
Feldman as having “held,” as to the judicial aspects of the D.C. court’s challenged action, that 
“the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over their complaints”37—a “determina-
tion” that “did not dispose of the entire case”38 but that apparently, in the Court’s view, did 
dispose of some of it.39  Moving on, the Exxon Mobil opinion mentions the Feldman Court’s use 
of the “inextricably intertwined” test in part III-B of that opinion as the basis for its having found 
no jurisdiction over the allegation that the D.C. court had acted arbitrarily in denying the peti-
tions for waiver—in contrast to the facial challenges to the admission rule, which “‘do not 
require review of a judicial decision in a particular case.’”40  Exxon Mobil thus parks Feldman’s 
36  See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983); Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 
285-87 (summarizing Feldman). 
37  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 285. 
38  Id. at 285. 
39  This reading of Feldman is questionable, because the Feldman Court went on to start part III-B by saying that it 
was “[a]pplying” the “standard” from part III-A to the plaintiffs’ complaints, and proceeded to deal with all aspects 
of their claims.  See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87; compare id. (dealing with five claims), with id. at 469 n.3 
(summarizing complaint as making same five claims).  However questionable it may thus be to read part III-A of 
Feldman as disposing of part of the case, the Exxon Mobil Court’s reading is plenty authoritative.  What is signifi-
cant for lower courts now is not the strength of our argument that the Court may have misread Feldman but that a 
unanimous Court has read it the way it has. 
40  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 286-87 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487).  The Court drops a footnote to mention a 
second appearance of the “inextricably intertwined” phrase in the Feldman opinion, where Feldman “explained that 
a district court could not entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment, even if the state court had 
not passed directly on those claims, when the constitutional attack was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state 
court’s judgment.”  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 286 n.1 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16).  Again, the Exxon 
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use of “inextricably intertwined” in a non-threshold part of the disposition, a siting fully consis-
tent with Exxon Mobil’s own disposition of the case before it without using “inextricably inter-
twined” as part of its analysis (as opposed to its description of other cases). 
 
 The remainder of Exxon Mobil’s part I briefly describes Supreme Court cases since Feld-
man that had declined to hold Rooker-Feldman applicable to bar lower-court jurisdiction.  Part II 
recounts the proceedings below.  Part III, which takes up under three pages in the United States 
Reports, restates the Court’s view of Rooker-Feldman,41 makes observations on the role of other 
doctrines that can affect the exercise of federal jurisdiction, refers to two lower-court decisions 
with apparent approval, and applies its view of Rooker-Feldman to reverse the Third Circuit’s 
finding of no jurisdiction.  The Court mentions the general tolerance of parallel state and federal 
litigation, observing that in such situations “the entry of judgment in state court” does not trigger 
Rooker-Feldman.42  It adds briefly that comity or abstention doctrines may support stay or 
dismissal of federal proceedings in favor of state adjudication43 and spends slightly more time 
pointing out that non-jurisdictional preclusion doctrines may apply when a state court has 
reached judgment in either parallel or previous litigation.44  Significantly for federal jurisdiction 
if not for the ultimate success of federal-court plaintiffs, the Court adds that a district court is not 
barred 
 
from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to liti-
gate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court.  If a federal 
plaintiff “present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal con-
clusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party . . ., then 
there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under 
principles of preclusion.”45
 
 The Court’s disposition of the case comes down to one paragraph, turning on the fact that 
ExxonMobil had not gone to federal court seeking to undo an already-rendered state-court 
judgment.  The company exercised its right to initiate parallel federal litigation shortly after its 
adversary sued in state court.  Thus, “Rooker-Feldman did not prevent the District Court from 
 
Mobil Court’s use of the phrase comes in a purely descriptive mode.  The third and last mention of “inextricably in-
tertwined” in Exxon Mobil comes near the end of part II, where the Court quotes the Third Circuit’s decision it is 
reviewing and reversing—once more in a wholly descriptive manner.  See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291. 
41  See supra note 31. 
42  See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292. 
43  See id. at 292. 
44  See id. at 293. 
45  Id. (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993), and citing with “accord” 
signal Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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exercising jurisdiction when ExxonMobil filed the federal action, and it did not emerge to van-
quish jurisdiction after ExxonMobil prevailed in the Delaware courts.”46  Nowhere in this opera-
tive part of the opinion does the Court invoke the “inextricably intertwined” test; instead, it 
directly applies its less formulaic distillation of circumstances in which Rooker-Feldman bars 
lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction.47
 
IV. EXXON MOBIL’S LIGHT AND SHADOWS 
 
 Exxon Mobil’s holding is actually quite narrow:  entry of a final judgment in state-court 
litigation does not oust properly attached original federal district-court jurisdiction over parallel 
litigation.  It may, of course, have preclusive effects that can deny the federal-court plaintiff 
relief for nonjurisdictional reasons, and the federal court might properly decide that it should 
abstain even before the state judgment.  Still, the Court’s approach seems to have several signifi-
cant implications for other Rooker-Feldman issues. 
 
A.  THE NON-THRESHOLD NATURE OF THE “INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED” INQUIRY 
 
 When we first read Exxon Mobil, it escaped us that the previously prominent “inextrica-
bly intertwined” test did absolutely none of the work in the case’s disposition.  As described 
above, the opinion quotes the phrase three times, saying nothing positive or negative about it; 
and these appearances are all in descriptive rather than analytical or dispositive parts.  What we 
now have in Exxon Mobil, therefore, is the most authoritative of examples that federal courts 
can, indeed apparently should, decide at least some Rooker-Feldman cases without making any 
real use of the “inextricably intertwined” concept.  That alone is a significant change from the 
pre-Exxon Mobil approach of some (but by no means all) circuits, which had used “inextricably 
intertwined” as a general or threshold test for applying Rooker-Feldman.48  In our view, anyone 
who now starts with the phrase in determining whether the doctrine applies either hasn’t read 
Exxon Mobil or hasn’t read it right.49  Instead, it appears that the place to begin is the Court’s 
distillation of the limited circumstances in which the doctrine applies.50  That formulation of -
Rooker-Feldman should be used to determine whether federal lower courts have jurisdiction, in 
46  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293-94. 
47  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
48  See, e.g., Tropf v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002) (“First, in order for the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to apply to a claim presented in federal district court, the issue before the Court must be [inextri-
cably intertwined] with the claim asserted in the state court”); Hill v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 
1999) (“Feldman only forecloses district court jurisdiction of claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the 
claims adjudicated in a state court.”). 
49  See, e.g., Ramos v. Nebraska, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1061 (D. Neb. 2005) (citing Exxon Mobil and continuing, 
“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine . . . precludes federal district court jurisdiction over federal claims that are ‘inex-
tricably intertwined’ with claims of the state court action.”). 
50  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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whole or in part, instead of filtering the situation through the “inextricably intertwined” test or 
anything else.  That is what the unanimous Supreme Court did in Exxon Mobil, and what the per 
curiam opinion in Lance did as well.  Because that analysis disposed of the case—by holding 
Rooker-Feldman entirely inapplicable—the Exxon Mobil Court went no further and, appropri-
ately, did not discuss what role “inextricably intertwined” may retain in Rooker-Feldman analy-
sis. 
 
 That leaves litigants, courts, and academics to try to figure it out, at least until the next 
time the Supreme Court takes a Rooker-Feldman case that involves the role of “inextricably 
intertwined” (don’t hold your breath).51  To be clear, we do not think it appropriate to conclude 
that the phrase can be entirely discarded; Exxon Mobil did not repudiate or expressly limit it, and 
Feldman used the term and remains good law at least as interpreted in Exxon Mobil.52  But we 
do suggest that “inextricably intertwined” can come into play only in a case that may involve 
partial applicability of Rooker-Feldman. 
 
 In some instances, direct application of the Exxon Mobil Court’s formulation may lead—
as it did in that case—to the conclusion that Rooker-Feldman is not applicable at all, despite 
some state-court adjudication.  In such situations the federal court has no occasion to deal with 
“inextricably intertwined.”  The court should move on to decide the possible preclusive effects 
of the state judgment and, if that does not dispose of the whole case, to the substantive merits.  In 
other cases, such as those like Rooker, it may be clear that the federal court entirely lacks juris-
diction and can only dismiss.  But, after Exxon Mobil, the lower court should proceed by apply-
ing that decision’s formulation without making any use of “inextricably intertwined.” 
 
 What remain are instances in which a federal court concludes that Rooker-Feldman 
applies to at least part of a case before it and must figure out how much of the remainder—if 
51  In its first and only Rooker-Feldman opinion since Exxon Mobil, the Court again disposed of the case before it—
by holding Rooker-Feldman entirely inapplicable because the federal plaintiff had not been a party in state court—
without having to consider the propriety of the district court’s use of the “inextricably intertwined” test as a re-
quirement for application of Rooker-Feldman.  See Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 1200, 1202-03 (2006) (per 
curiam). 
52  The Second and Fourth Circuits have since suggested that “inextricably intertwined” may now be regarded as a 
phrase that has no independent content and serves only as a label for claims that are barred by the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine.  See Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he phrase `inextri-
cably intertwined’ has no independent content.  It is simply a descriptive label attached to claims that meet the 
requirements outlined in Exxon Mobil.”); Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(“Under Exxon, then, Feldman's ‘inextricably intertwined’ language does not create an additional legal test for 
determining when claims challenging a state-court decision are barred, but merely states a conclusion:  if the state-
court loser seeks redress in the federal district court for the injury caused by the state-court decision, his federal 
claim is, by definition, ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state-court decision, and is therefore outside of the 
jurisdiction of the federal district court.”) (citing Hoblock).  That is a harmless enough view of the role that the 
phrase should now play, but it does not strike us as consistent with the Exxon Mobil Court’s description of Feldman 
and the post-threshold role that the Court appears to see “inextricably intertwined” as now playing.  See supra text 
accompanying note 40. 
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any—is subject to the doctrine.  That was the situation in the Supreme Court’s other major 
Rooker-Feldman decision, Feldman itself.  Exxon Mobil’s discussion of Feldman can plausibly 
be read as implying that it is at this sorting stage that “inextricably intertwined” may, indeed 
perhaps should, come into play.53  Along these lines, a leading Ninth Circuit case decided before 
Exxon Mobil, Noel v. Hall,54 developed an approach to Rooker-Feldman that now appears 
consistent with Exxon Mobil and with the view advanced here.  Noel’s discussion is worth 
quoting at some length: 
 
A federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden [by Rooker-
Feldman] de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court must refuse to 
hear the forbidden appeal.  As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide 
any issue raised in the suit that is “inextricably intertwined” with an issue re-
solved by the state court in its judicial decision.   
 
 The premise for the operation of the “inextricably intertwined” test in 
Feldman is that the federal plaintiff is seeking to bring a forbidden de facto ap-
peal.  The federal suit is not a forbidden de facto appeal because it is “inextricably 
intertwined” with something.  Rather, it is simply a forbidden de facto appeal.55  
Only when there is already a forbidden de facto appeal does the “inextricably in-
tertwined” test come into play:  Once a federal plaintiff seeks to bring a forbidden 
de facto appeal, as in Feldman, that federal plaintiff may not seek to litigate an is-
sue that is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judicial decision from 
which the forbidden de facto appeal is brought.56
  
 In this connection, in determining whether a case involves a forbidden de facto appeal, a 
federal court should focus on the relief sought and whether it would go to the state-court judg-
ment itself, rather than to the issues raised57—which can, of course, be vital when issue preclu-
53  See supra text accompanying note 40 (discussing Exxon Mobil’s treatment of “inextricably intertwined” in its 
reading of Feldman). 
54  341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003).  The Exxon Mobil opinion cites Noel favorably, see 544 U.S. at 293, albeit for a 
part of the Noel opinion that deals with a different aspect of Rooker-Feldman from that discussed in the text that 
follows. 
55  The initial determination whether a forbidden de facto appeal is involved should presumably be made, after 
Exxon Mobil, by applying that case’s distillation of Rooker-Feldman. [Footnote by authors, not Noel court.] 
56  Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. 
57  See, e.g., Guttman v. Khalsa, 401 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen determining whether the federal 
plaintiff asserts a legal injury by an adverse party or by a state-court judgment, we must look to the relief sought, 
not simply to the issues raised”), vacated and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 321 (2005); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 
895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (“‘[W]e cannot simply compare the issues involved in the state-court proceeding to those 
raised in the federal-court plaintiff's complaint.’ . . . Rather, under Rooker-Feldman, `we must pay close attention to 
the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.’”) (quoting Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 476 (10th 
Cir. 2002)). 
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sion may apply.  Under Exxon Mobil’s formulation, if the relief sought does not include the 
review and rejection of the state-court judgment, Rooker-Feldman does not apply,58 and the 
court will have no need to inquire whether the issues raised are inextricably intertwined with the 
state-court judgment. 
 
 Cases of the sort described by Noel as involving proper applicability of the “inextricably 
intertwined” aspect of the Rooker-Feldman analysis may not be all that common, but they do 
arise.  The Ninth Circuit opinion explains: 
 
As a practical matter, the “inextricably intertwined” test of Feldman is likely to 
apply primarily in cases in which the state court both promulgates and applies the 
rule at issue—that is, to the category of cases in which the local court has acted in 
both a legislative and a judicial capacity—and in which the loser in state court 
later challenges in federal court both the rule and its application.59
  
Examples are bar-admission rules of the sort involved in Feldman, as well as litigation and 
attorney-discipline rules.60  The “inextricably intertwined” test in such cases, of course, can end 
up pointing either way.  In Feldman itself, general challenges to the constitutionality of the bar-
admission requirement, i.e., objections to actions of the D.C. court in a legislative rather than 
judicial capacity that did not “require review of a judicial decision in a particular case,”61 were 
not barred. 
 
 The Ninth Circuit in Noel cites a nice example of a contrasting case in which a challenge 
that was not itself a “forbidden de facto appeal”—but that was part of a case involving such an 
effort in other respects—failed the “inextricably intertwined” test.  In Facio v. Jones,62 a major-
ity of a Tenth Circuit panel held that Rooker-Feldman not only directly barred an effort to get a 
federal district court to “set aside” a state-court judgment,63 but also—now but only now using 
the “inextricably intertwined” test—a claim for declaratory relief (that the challenged state-court 
58  See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 291 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of 
the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name:  cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 
caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. . . .  In both 
[Rooker and Feldman], the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court . . ., complaining of an injury caused 
by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.”). 
59  Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. 
60  See id. 
61  Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487. 
62  929 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1991). 
63  See id. at 543. 
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rule relied on by the state court was invalid as applied to reach that very judgment).6  4  In such 
cases, as a post-Noel Ninth Circuit opinion put it, “the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test ma[kes] 
good sense, for it prevent[s the federal plaintiff] from making an end-run around the rule against 
de facto appeals.”6  5
64  See id.; Noel, 341 F.3d at 1157 & n.7 (discussing Facio and emphasizing as-applied nature of request for declara-
tory relief); accord, Willner v. Frey, No. 1:05CV1315, 2006 WL 680997, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2006) (Rooker-
Feldman bars federal action seeking injunction ordering state-court clerk to remove state court’s final order from 
county land records, as well as declaration that state statute is unconstitutional as applied; as-applied claim, even if 
not raised in state court, is “inextricably intertwined” with state-court judgment).  
 We have discussed so far only the possible place of “inextricably intertwined” in the structure of Rooker-
Feldman analysis, not its content or breadth when applicable.  It does, though, seem fair to infer from Exxon Mobil 
that federal courts should not apply the concept expansively.  The Court has emphasized both the general narrow-
ness of Rooker-Feldman, see, e.g., Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284 (speaking of “the narrow ground occupied by 
Rooker-Feldman”), and characteristics of cases when it can apply such as that the federal plaintiffs are “complain-
ing of injuries caused by state-court judgments” and “inviting district court review and rejection of those judg-
ments”).  See infra note 96 (retrospectively criticizing broad Seventh Circuit panel ruling on these grounds). 
 A definition of “inextricably intertwined” that seems inappropriate after Exxon Mobil is one from Associ-
ate Justice Thurgood Marshall’s concurrence in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in judgment).  Justice Marshall’s statement that “a federal claim is inextricably intertwined . . . if the 
federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it,” id., had proved 
mischievous, some lower courts having used it to support sweeping applications of Rooker-Feldman.  See, e.g., 
DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 517 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2004) (based on Justice Marshall’s language, Rooker-
Feldman requires “the dismissal of claims that involve an injury predating the state-court proceedings on the 
exclusive grounds that the issues that the federal court would have to decide are inextricably intertwined with the 
state-court decision, in that to allow relief would require the conclusion that the state court had wrongly decided the 
issues before it.”), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005); Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 492-93 (8th Cir. 
2000) (“a corollary to the basic rule against reviewing judgments prohibits federal district courts from exercising 
jurisdiction over general constitutional claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with specific claims already 
adjudicated in state court”); id. at 495 (holding nonparties subject to Rooker-Feldman), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 
(2001).  See generally 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[3][c][ii], at 133-30.5 
(3d ed. 2006).  Exxon Mobil cited the Marshall concurrence as a “But cf.” after a list of other Court cases refusing to 
find Rooker-Feldman applicable, without quoting his definition of “inextricably intertwined.”  See 544 U.S. at 288.  
The context and manner of citation suggest some disapproval, and if we are any good at reading opinions the 
following statement later in Exxon Mobil puts a stake in the heart of the Marshall articulation:  “Nor does § 1257 
stop a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal 
court a matter previously litigated in state court.” 544 U.S. at 293.  The Court then points out that the defendant may 
prevail under applicable state-law preclusion principles.  See id. (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 
F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)).   
 
65  Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 The Noel-Kougasian approach may not be entirely free from difficulty.  If the federal-court plaintiff in 
Facio had brought the as-applied declaratory-judgment claim on its own, it would have been no less “inextricably 
intertwined” with the state-court judgment for lack of another aspect of the federal-court case that amounted to a 
forbidden de facto appeal from that judgment.  As the Facio court explained, however, in such an instance the as-
applied claim, standing alone, ordinarily would be dismissed for lack of Article III standing if the federal plaintiff 
were not also seeking to set aside the judgment in which the rule was applied.  See Facio, 929 F.2d at 543-44: 
 
Unless Mr. Facio's default judgment is upset, his only interest in Utah's default judgment proce-
dures is prospective and hypothetical in nature.  He cannot establish a sufficient interest in the fu-
ture application of those procedures to him to establish a constitutional case or controversy. 
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 Again, to be clear about what we are and are not claiming:  Exxon Mobil does not en-
dorse, and we do not suggest that its logic necessarily mandates, Noel’s approach to the role of 
“inextricably intertwined” in Rooker-Feldman analysis.  But we do see this aspect of Noel as 
consistent with the Exxon Mobil Court’s reading of Feldman and its overall analytical approach.  
We also see Noel as adopting an analysis that is sensible and understandable, appropriately 
retaining a role for “inextricably intertwined” while keeping that concept within reasonable 
bounds, thereby taking a valuable step toward curbing what some of us had viewed as metastases 
of Rooker-Feldman until Exxon Mobil advanced a positive restraining process. 
 
B.  ROOKER-FELDMAN AND PRECLUSION 
 
 One of Exxon Mobil’s more significant effects should be to reduce what had been an 
uncertain and vexing degree of overlap between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion.66  The Court 
was expressly critical of a Second Circuit opinion that had largely conflated Rooker-Feldman 
and preclusion.67  After Exxon Mobil, federal courts should determine whether Rooker-Feldman 
deprives them of jurisdiction in whole or in part without thinking about preclusion at the thresh-
old.  They should apply the Court’s formulations for the doctrine’s applicability and, in a partial-
bar case, perhaps the “inextricably intertwined” test as cabined by Exxon Mobil.6  8
 What they should avoid, as the recent follow-up Lance decision makes clear, is general 
resort to preclusion law even as an aid in determining applicability of Rooker-Feldman.69  If any 
 
 Because Mr. Facio’s threshold ability to establish standing with regard to his claim for 
declaratory relief is dependent upon his ability to upset the default judgment against him, that pre-
sents a classic case of an inextricably intertwined relationship between the two requested types of 
relief. 
  
 Rooker-Feldman’s applicability, therefore, would not become an issue unless the federal plaintiff joined 
the as-applied declaratory-judgment claim with a de facto appeal from the underlying state-court judgment.  Thus, 
in the case of a stand-alone as-applied challenge to a state rule, the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry still would not 
serve as a threshold test for applicability of Rooker-Feldman. 
66  See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469.1, at 159-60 (3d ed. 2002) 
(footnote omitted): 
 
The well-developed doctrines of res judicata and full faith and credit, supplemented by abstention 
and comity, protect state interests as well as should be.  Res judicata protects a judgment more 
than appeal; the limitations on res judicata—-ordinarily drawn from the law of the forum state—-
permit much less reconsideration than occurs on direct appeal.  Significant confusions and dan-
gers are emerging as lower courts attempt to translate these doctrines into jurisdictional terms, 
without significant benefits.  Rooker-Feldman theory should be pared back to the irreducible core. 
67  See supra note 29 and text accompanying notes 28-29. 
68  See supra note 64 and text accompanying notes 50-64. 
69  See Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. at 1202 (per curiam): 
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jurisdiction remains after the application of the purely federal Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional 
doctrine, the federal court may consider the applicability of the distinct and largely state-law 
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion that govern in federal courts under the full faith and 
credit statute.70  As a result, Rooker-Feldman will be narrower than preclusion more often than 
had been the case in some federal courts before Exxon Mobil.71
 
C.  PLAINTIFF-DEFENDANT DISTINCTION 
 
 The Seventh Circuit has developed a rule of thumb that Rooker-Feldman is more likely to 
apply if the federal-court plaintiff was the defendant in state court, because then the plaintiff will 
usually be complaining about the effects of the state court’s judgment.  By contrast, the Seventh 
Circuit has explained, a federal-court plaintiff who was also the plaintiff in state court will more 
often be complaining about out-of-court action by the adversary against which the state courts 
refused to grant relief, in which case preclusion principles rather than Rooker-Feldman should 
guide the federal court.72  This distinction is not absolute; indeed, both Rooker and Feldman 
applied the doctrine against federal-court plaintiffs who had also been relief-seekers in state 
court and who asked the federal courts to undo state judgments against them.7  
 
3
 The Seventh Circuit’s rule of thumb may or may not survive Exxon Mobil.  The Supreme 
Court’s references to “state-court losers”74 and “the losing party in state court”75 are not side-
specific.  But Exxon Mobil also says that the state-court losers, when Rooker-Feldman applies, 
are “complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments,”76 the same factor upon which the 
 
In determining whether privity existed [for purposes of whether Rooker-Feldman barred federal 
jurisdiction over an action by a nonparty to prior state-court adjudication], the [lower] court 
looked to cases concerning the preclusive effect that state courts are required to give federal-court 
judgments.  [In so doing it] erroneously conflated preclusion law with Rooker-Feldman. 
70  28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).  Cf. Lance, 126 S. Ct. at 1202-03: 
 
Congress has directed federal courts to look principally to state law in deciding what effect to give 
state-court judgments.  Incorporation of preclusion principles into Rooker-Feldman risks turning 
that limited doctrine into a uniform federal rule governing the preclusive effect of state-court 
judgments, contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Act. 
71  If Rooker-Feldman bars federal lower-court review of interlocutory state-court decisions that would not have 
preclusive effect (as we think it should, see infra text accompanying notes 97-107), the doctrine can in those 
situations be broader than preclusion. 
72  See, e.g., Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365-68 (7th Cir. 1996). 
73  See id. at 1367-68 (discussing application of and exceptions to rule of thumb). 
74  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 
75  Id. at 291. 
76  Id. at 284; see also id. at 291 (“complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment”). 
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Seventh Circuit based its rule of thumb.  So the Seventh Circuit’s rule may still be helpful:  
apply Rooker-Feldman more often when the federal-court plaintiff was the state-court defendant, 
and apply preclusion more often when the federal-court plaintiff was the plaintiff in state court.  
Still, what seems important is to focus on the factors used by the Supreme Court, including 
whether it is the effects of a state-court judgment about which the federal plaintiff (whether 
plaintiff or defendant in state court) is complaining. 
 
D.  APPLICABILITY OF ROOKER-FELDMAN TO STATE-COURT NONPARTIES:  LANCE V. DENNIS 
 
 Exxon Mobil by itself seemed to call into question the Eighth Circuit’s application of 
Rooker-Feldman in Lemonds v. St. Louis County77 to those who were not parties to prior state-
court litigation.  The Court emphasized that the doctrine was limited to cases involving federal-
court suits brought by “state-court losers”78 and, as in both Rooker and Feldman, “the losing 
party in state court.”79  Most recently, the Court in Lance v. Dennis80 has made clearer just how 
sharply it meant to limit the doctrine:  a federal-court plaintiff not a party to prior state-court 
litigation is not to be held barred by Rooker-Feldman just because preclusion law would have 
found the federal plaintiff in privity with the state-court loser.81  The history of the lower courts’ 
use of Rooker-Feldman in this context illustrates how the doctrine had sometimes been extended 
“far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases.”8  2
 
In 1994, the Supreme Court held that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable if the party against 
whom the doctrine is invoked was not a party to the underlying state-court proceeding.83  Never-
theless, some lower courts went on to apply Rooker-Feldman to bar suits brought by nonparties 
to prior state-court litigation.  In the most far-reaching example, the Eighth Circuit in Lemonds 
applied Rooker-Feldman to bar a federal suit on the ground that the action was “inextricably 
intertwined” with and could undo a prior state-court judgment, even though the federal plaintiffs 
77  222 F.3d 488, 495 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001). 
 The Eighth Circuit’s position was decidedly a minority view.  See, e.g., 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[3][c], at 133-30.5 to -30.12 & n.36 (3d ed. 2006) (citing cases from five 
circuits in support of proposition that “it is axiomatic that nonparties in the state court action, with no ability to 
appeal the state court decision, cannot be bound by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”). 
78  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 
79  Id. at 291. 
80  126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006) (per curiam). 
81  See id. at 1202-03. 
82  See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283, quoted in Lance, 126 S. Ct. at 1201. 
83  See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006 (1994) (“[T]he invocation of Rooker/Feldman is . . . inapt here, 
for unlike Rooker or Feldman, the United States was not a party in the state court.  It was in no position to ask this 
Court to review the state court's judgment and has not directly attacked it in this proceeding.”). 
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had not been parties in state court.84  Other courts, such as the Tenth Circuit in Kenmen Engi-
neering v. City of Union,85 found Rooker-Feldman applicable against federal plaintiffs who had 
not been named parties in state court but who were in privity with parties to earlier state-court 
actions.86
 
Even after Exxon Mobil, with its insistence generally on narrow applicability of Rooker-
Feldman and its particular reference to “state-court losers” and “the losing party in state 
court”—not to mention its cleaving between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion—some lower 
courts continued to look to privity principles from preclusion doctrine to extend Rooker-Feldman 
to bar federal-court actions by those who had not themselves been parties to prior state litigation.  
Thus, the Second Circuit in Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections87 held that Exxon 
Mobil left room for courts to apply privity concepts developed under preclusion doctrines to 
determine whether federal plaintiffs, “despite not having appeared in state court, should nonethe-
less be considered state-court losers for Rooker-Feldman purposes.”88  And a three-judge Colo-
rado federal district court similarly used preclusion law to hold citizens in privity, and thus afoul 
of Rooker-Feldman, because of prior government litigation on a matter of public concern.89
 
This time, the Supreme Court in Lance acted quickly to head off another round of 
Rooker-Feldman expansion, granting cert and summarily reversing the Colorado decision in a 
per curiam opinion.  The history of the litigation in the state and lower federal courts seems not 
worth detailing; for our purposes what is important is that the Lance Court emphatically rejected 
the use of privity concepts borrowed from preclusion doctrines to expand the reach of Rooker-
Feldman.  Since the Lance plaintiffs were not parties to the underlying state-court litigation—
they had not participated in the proceedings and were not in a “‘position to ask this Court to 
review the state court’s judgment’”90—the Court held that the district court erred when it used 
privity principles to treat the federal plaintiffs as state-court losers: 
84  See Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 495. 
85  314 F.3d 468 (10th Cir. 2002). 
86  See id. at 481 (officer of and joint venturers with named state-court party); see also Amaya v. Pitner, 130 Fed. 
Appx. 25, 26-27 (7th Cir. 2005) (successor in title). 
87  422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005).  
88  Id. at 89; see id. at 90 (“While we recognize that claim and issue preclusion are distinct from the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine, we believe that federal case law governing the application of preclusion doctrines to nonparties should 
guide the analogous inquiry in the Rooker-Feldman context.”) 
89  See Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1125 (D. Colo. 2005) (“In determining when privity exists for 
Rooker-Feldman purposes, it is helpful to look to cases dealing with privity in the context of issue and claim 
preclusion . . . .  We believe that the principle . . . that the outcome of the government's litigation over a matter of 
public concern binds its citizens . . . should apply . . . in the Rooker-Feldman context.”), rev’d sub nom. Lance v. 
Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006) (per curiam). 
90  Lance, 126 S. Ct. at 1202 (quoting De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1006). 
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The District Court erroneously conflated preclusion law with Rooker-Feldman.  
Whatever the impact of privity principles on preclusion rules, Rooker-Feldman is 
not simply preclusion by another name.  The doctrine applies only in “limited cir-
cumstances,” where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable 
state-court decision to a lower federal court.  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does 
not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, 
for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to 
the judgment.91
 
The Court went on to explain that incorporating federal preclusion principles92 into Rooker-
Feldman would risk “turning that limited doctrine into a uniform federal rule governing the 
preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Act,”93 which 
requires federal courts to look to state law in deciding what effect to give state-court judgments. 
 
 Lance expressly left open the question whether there might be some limited circum-
stances under which Rooker-Feldman could be applied against a party not named in an earlier 
state-court proceeding (for example, when a decedent’s “estate takes a de facto appeal in a 
district court of an earlier state-court decision involving the decedent”94).  However, after Lance 
it is clear that Exxon Mobil’s limitation of Rooker-Feldman to suits brought by state-court losers 
forecloses the broad “privity” analysis used by the Kenmen and Hoblock courts.  And it is diffi-
cult to see how Lemonds’s use of “inextricably intertwined” analysis95 to apply Rooker-Feldman 
to nonparties in state court can survive Exxon Mobil and Lance.96
91  Lance, 126 S. Ct. at 1202 (citation and footnote omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291). 
92  The district court in Lance, like the Second Circuit in Hoblock, looked to cases concerning the preclusive effect 
that state courts are required to give federal-court judgments.  See Lance, 126 S. Ct. at 1200; Hoblock v. Albany Bd. 
of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2005). 
93  Lance, 126 S. Ct. at 1203 (emphasis in original); see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). 
94  Lance, 126 S. Ct. at 1202 n.2. 
95  See Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 495-96. 
96  To be sure, those who had not been parties to prior state-court adjudication—even if not subject to Rooker-Feld-
man or preclusion—might still be subject to the precedential effect of a state court’s rulings, particularly if state-law 
issues decided by the state courts remained relevant in the federal litigation. 
 Unnamed members of a class that lost, or failed to win as much as the members would have liked, in state 
court could also be “state-court losers” for purposes of Rooker-Feldman.  Cf., e.g., Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 
1, 10 (2002) (unnamed class members who timely object to settlement may be treated as “parties” for purposes of 
appeal); Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (unnamed class 
members who appear at final fairness hearing and object to proposed settlement have standing to appeal).  Thus, one 
premise of the Seventh Circuit’s controversial decision in Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510 
(7th Cir. 1996) (no jurisdiction over federal-court attack on state court’s approval of attorney fees in class-action 
settlement, brought by class members over whom state court arguably lacked jurisdiction), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 
1204 (1997), seems sound:  the federal-court plaintiffs, as supposed “winners” in a state-court class settlement that 
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E.  APPLICABILITY TO INTERLOCUTORY AND INTERMEDIATE STATE-COURT RULINGS 
 
 Federal courts have been somewhat divided about whether Rooker-Feldman can bar 
lower federal-court jurisdiction when a state court has made an interlocutory ruling, such as 
granting a preliminary injunction.  The majority position has been to apply the doctrine, albeit 
with some strong opposing views.97  Different passages in Exxon Mobil might be read to support 
either view, but we suggest that the issue is better approached by reasoning from basic princi-
ples—and concluding that Rooker-Feldman can apply—than by parsing the Supreme Court’s 
indeterminate discussion. 
 
 Language bearing on whether Rooker-Feldman might apply to interlocutory state-court 
rulings appears in two places in the Exxon-Mobil opinion.  We view these two statements as 
meant to be identical in effect even though they differ slightly in expression.98  In the first, the 
Court speaks of “state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.”99  A state-court “judgment” might 
be construed to include the likes of a grant of a preliminary injunction, which could be viewed as 
a non-final judgment; that interpretation would bar a federal district court from entertaining a 
later-commenced action that sought to undo the state court’s preliminary injunction.  But the 
Court’s second articulation describes the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as involving situations in 
which the state-court loser “filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended.”100  Read 
 
left them out of pocket because of an attorney-fee award exceeding their recovery, could be viewed as parties to the 
state litigation if it properly included them.  But the Exxon Mobil Court’s emphasis on certain factors—such as 
complaint about “an injury caused by the state-court judgment” and an effort to seek “review and rejection of that 
judgment,” 544 U.S. at 291—cast doubt on the Seventh Circuit’s extension of Rooker-Feldman to aspects of the 
Kamilewicz complaint such as a claim for malpractice against the class’s lawyers.  See Kamilewicz v. Bank of 
Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1351-52 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1204 (1997).  Regarding such claims as “inextricably intertwined” with the state-court 
class settlement, Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 511 (panel opinion), seems too much of a stretch after Exxon Mobil’s 
emphasis on Rooker-Feldman’s specific characteristics and general narrowness.  (Co-author Rowe was a frustrated 
signer of a cert petition in Kamilewicz.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Teachers in Support of Petition & Motion 
for Leave to Appeal, 1997 WL 33561346, at *2, Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 520 U.S. 1204 (1997) (No. 
96-1184).) 
97  See Pieper v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 460-65 (6th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases both ways), 
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1182 (2004). 
98  See supra note 31 and accompanying text (quoting the Exxon Mobil Court’s two general formulations of when 
Rooker-Feldman applies). 
99  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 
100  Id. at 291. 
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literally, that language could be regarded as saying that Rooker-Feldman bars federal-court 
challenges only to final state-court judgments.101
 
 Arguing from these kinds of fine linguistic differences, in an opinion in which the Court 
was not focusing on the final-versus-interlocutory distinction, does not seem to us to be a fruitful 
exercise.  It makes sense instead to start from a foundational principle undergirding Rooker-
Feldman:  the only federal court to which Congress has given any statutory authority to review 
state-court judgments102 is the Supreme Court.103  That principle supports the applicability of 
Rooker-Feldman to interlocutory and final state-court judgments alike.104  Indeed, it would be an 
101  For an intermediate position construing Exxon Mobil’s “after the state proceedings ended” to include situations 
in which state proceedings continue but “have finally resolved all federal questions in the litigation,” so that 
Rooker-Feldman could still apply despite the lack of a final state-court judgment, see Federacion de Maestros v. 
Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo, 410 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005); accord, Guttman v. Khalsa, No. 03-2244, 2006 
WL 1017636, at *3 (10th Cir. Apr. 19, 2006) (“Under Exxon Mobil, Rooker-Feldman applies only to suits filed 
after state proceedings are final.”) (footnote citing and quoting Federacion de Maestros omitted).  To the extent that 
view might permit lower federal-court review of, say, a state court’s decision on a preliminary injunction with 
federal-law issues involved, we question this limit on Rooker-Feldman in light of the Court’s not entirely consistent 
language and the argument from basic principle advanced in the text that immediately follows.  Of course Exxon 
Mobil generally allows the filing of parallel federal-court actions while state-court litigation is pending.  What we 
question is jurisdiction to entertain efforts seeking relief against interlocutory orders already entered by state courts.   
102  Habeas corpus aside, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.  It may also be that federal bankruptcy courts 
can set aside state judgments in some circumstances.  See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE §  133.30[3][b], at 133-28 & n.20.5  (3d ed. 2006); Sasson v. Sokoloff (In re Sasson), 424 F.3d 864, 871 
(9th Cir. 2005); Bozich v. Mattschull (In re Chinin U.S.A., Inc.), 327 B.R. 325, 335-36 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (alternative 
holding).  We see nothing in Exxon Mobil, aside from its cagey observation that Congressional power to “empower 
district courts to oversee certain state court judgments” has been exercised “most notably” with habeas for state 
prisoners, 544 U.S. at 292 n.8, that sheds any light on whether some lower federal courts’ special treatment of 
bankruptcy for Rooker-Feldman purposes may be appropriate.  And the vague “most notably” reservation, although 
more open than possible alternatives such as “only” or “solely,” is too meager a ground on which to base any 
reasoning about what the Court might do when facing a bankruptcy court’s voiding of a state-court decision. 
 
103  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292 (quoting Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 
644 n.3 (“‘The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, 
and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress 
has reserved to [the Supreme] Court, see [28 U.S.C.] § 1257(a).’”)). 
104  But see RegScan, Inc. v. Brewer, No. Civ. A. 04-6043, 2005 WL 874662 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2005) (finding no 
Rooker-Feldman-Exxon Mobil bar to jurisdiction when state court, before filing of federal action, had denied leave 
to amend complaint on possibly substantive grounds in still-pending state-court litigation).  We are not persuaded. 
 We should add, though, that even if we are correct that Rooker-Feldman applies to interlocutory as well as 
final state-court rulings, we are aware of no decisions (and we’ve looked) that hold the doctrine to bar federal 
injunctions against state proceedings when such an injunction would be appropriate under the necessary-in-aid-of-
jurisdiction or protecting-or-effectuating-judgments exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 
(2000).  As the Ninth Circuit has put it, if an argument that such a federal order “amounted to direct federal district 
court review of a state court decision . . . were to succeed, it would be impossible for a federal court to enjoin a state 
court proceeding, despite satisfying an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act . . .”  United States v. Alpine Land & 
Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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odd review structure if the lower federal courts had some form of de facto appellate jurisdiction 
over interlocutory state-court rulings under a narrow construction of Rooker-Feldman while the 
Supreme Court was statutorily limited to reviewing final judgments of the highest state court in 
which a judgment could be had.105  The principle that only the Supreme Court has any statutory 
appellate jurisdiction over state courts also supports Rooker-Feldman’s applicability to judg-
ments of lower state courts.106  In short, although we see Exxon Mobil as appropriately narrow-
ing the applicability of Rooker-Feldman in significant respects, we also think it important not to 
overread the decision.107
 
F.  WHEN THE FEDERAL PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE A CLAIM IN STATE COURT 
 
 A final point on which the lower federal courts have been somewhat divided is whether 
Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction as to federal claims that the federal-court plaintiff did not raise 
in state court, either by choice or for lack of opportunity.108  Exxon Mobil strikes us as largely 
resolving these matters against Rooker-Feldman’s applicability.  If the doctrine poses no juris-
dictional bar “simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously 
litigated in state court,”109 it is hard to see how it would do so when the matter had not been 
litigated in state court.  Preclusion principles may of course apply—either claim preclusion, as 
from the splitting of related claims when the federal-court plaintiff had an opportunity to raise a 
claim in state court and failed to do so, or issue preclusion when the state court resolved a point 
relevant to an unprecluded federal claim. 
105  See supra note 12 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000)); Pieper, 336 F.3d at 464 (“We believe that it is unten-
able that the Supreme Court’s lack of jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals or appeals from lower state courts 
somehow opens up the possibility of review in the lower federal courts.”).  But see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 
4469.1, at 147 (“It seems particularly questionable to bar federal-question jurisdiction if the courts of other states, 
and indeed other courts of the same state, would have jurisdiction to entertain the same federal question.”). 
106  See 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[3][c][I], at 133-30.3 to -30.4 & nn.34.1-34.2 (3d ed. 2006). 
107  One district-court opinion regards “the Court's stated desire to rein in expansive interpretations of Rooker-Feld-
man” as “leaving its application to non-final orders in doubt.”  Soad Wattar Living Trust of 1992 v. Jenner & Block, 
P.C., No. 04 C 6390, 2005 WL 1651191, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2005).  For the reasons given in the text, we do not 
think that Exxon Mobil’s general effort to narrow the doctrine should lead courts to apply it more narrowly in all 
respects. 
108  Compare Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 478-79 (10th Cir. 2002) (Rooker-Feldman applies 
even if state court did not provide full and fair opportunity to litigate claim), and Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. 
Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2001) (Rooker-Feldman bars all federal claims that were or should have 
been central to state-court decision, even if those claims seek form of relief that might not have been available from 
state court), with Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 558-60 (7th Cir. 1999) (Rooker-Feldman does not 
apply to issue “if the plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise the issue in state court proceedings”); 
Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 466-67 (11th Cir. 1996) (Rooker-Feldman does not apply to claims that litigant had 
no reasonable opportunity to raise in state court); and Getty v. Reed, 547 F.2d 971, 976 (6th Cir. 1977) (Rooker 
applies only to claims actually raised and voluntarily litigated in state court). 
109  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293. 
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 At the very least, Exxon Mobil should make Rooker-Feldman inapplicable when the 
federal-court plaintiff had no full and fair opportunity to litigate its federal claim in state court, 
as lower federal courts before and since Exxon Mobil have held.110  Perhaps only in the narrow 
situation exemplified by the Tenth Circuit’s Facio decision111—when the state court was both 
rule-maker and rule-applier, and a federal-court plaintiff (already partially barred by Rooker-
Feldman from challenging the state court’s adjudication) presented a federal claim that was 
“inextricably intertwined” with the state ruling—would Rooker-Feldman bar jurisdiction over a 
federal claim not ruled on by the state court.112  But it now seems that broader applications of 
Rooker-Feldman—as opposed to preclusion—against federal-court plaintiffs should apparently 
be viewed as relics of the bad old days, excessively conflating the two types of doctrine, before 
Exxon Mobil largely sorted them out. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 What had seemed to be serious over-extensions of Rooker-Feldman by some (not all) 
lower federal courts had led a few observers to question whether the doctrine was worth even the 
powder to blow it up.113  Whether anyone thinks after Exxon Mobil that the doctrine should be 
discarded lock, stock, and barrel we do not know.114  We would not be disturbed if the Supreme 
110  See, e.g., last three cases cited in note 108 supra; Cervantes v. City of Harvey, 373 F. Supp. 2d 815, 820 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005) (“Exxon Mobil reiterated the ‘independent claim’ exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  . . .  How-
ever, a claim is considered ‘independent’ only when there was no ‘reasonable opportunity’ to raise the claim in the 
state court proceeding.”).  So restricting the independent-claim exception does not seem to be a necessary reading of 
Exxon Mobil, given the Court’s narrow view of Rooker-Feldman.  If applicable state law does not preclude volun-
tarily omitted claims--although it very often will do so—-it is not clear why a restricted Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
should keep federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over them. 
111  See supra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
112  A Fourth Circuit opinion views Exxon Mobil more broadly, saying that “‘[t]he “inextricably intertwined” prong 
of the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine bars a claim that was not actually decided by the state court but where success on 
the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.’”  Wash-
ington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 
198 (4th Cir. 2000)).  This view seems irreconcilable with the Exxon Mobil Court’s favorable quotation of a 
Seventh Circuit opinion: 
 
If a federal plaintiff “present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion 
that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party . . ., then there is jurisdiction and 
state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.” 
 
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
113  See the title of the symposium foreword by Rowe, supra note 3; id. at 1081 n.* (crediting turn of phrase to Prof. 
David Shapiro). 
114  Justice Stevens’s dissent in Lance v. Dennis might be read as indicating that he believes Rooker-Feldman has 
already been discarded:  “Last term, in [Exxon Mobil], the Court finally interred the so-called `Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine.’  And today, the Court quite properly disapproves of the District Court’s resuscitation of a doctrine that 
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Court instructed the lower federal courts to quit using the “inextricably intertwined” phrase in 
this context and just to apply the Exxon Mobil formulation across the board.  But we cannot say 
that we think lower federal courts would now be justified in doing so themselves on the strength 
of Exxon Mobil.115  In any event it seems to make sense, given the present statutory structure of 
district courts’ original and the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, for the federal trial courts 
to dismiss de facto appeals from state courts for want of jurisdiction.  As caged and refined by 
Exxon Mobil, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine—we hope—should be able to enforce that limit 
without the exuberant overgrowth that had sprung from the doctrine’s modest roots. 
 
has produced nothing but mischief for 23 years.”  Lance, 126 S. Ct. at 1203-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted).  However, Justice Stevens—who had been the sole dissenter in Feldman, see 460 U.S. at 488-90—joined 
the unanimous Exxon Mobil opinion that expressly recognized Rooker-Feldman as an extant, albeit narrow, doc-
trine.  See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of the 
kind from which the doctrine acquired its name”). 
 Also, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Lance was not based on a disagreement with the per curiam majority’s 
characterization or application of Rooker-Feldman:  “My disagreement with the majority arises not from what it 
actually decides, but from what it fails to address.  Even though the District Court mistakenly believed it had no 
jurisdiction to hear the matter, its judgment dismissing the cause with prejudice was correct and should be af-
firmed.”  See Lance, 126 S. Ct. at 1204 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Rather, he agreed with the Lance majority’s 
holding that Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable, but dissented because he thought the Court should have applied 
state preclusion law to affirm the lower court’s judgment of dismissal.  See id.  Therefore, we believe Justice Ste-
vens’s characterization of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as “interred” is best understood as a hyperbolic (even 
playful?) reference to Exxon Mobil’s narrowing of the lower courts’ unwarranted expansions of the doctrine. 
115  See supra text in paragraph following note 50. 
